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Summary 
 
In the winter of 2005 a 52-year-old male emergency roadside technician (ERT), (providing 
traffic control support for police), died when he fell approximately 75 – 80 feet from a bridge 
after being struck by a single-unit truck.  A policeman had responded to a call from a semi-truck 
driver on the interstate who had blown a tire while driving on an interstate.  After the tire blew, 
the driver immediately pulled the semi onto the right shoulder and called police for assistance.  
This section of the shoulder was on a bridge on the blind side of a hill, and was too narrow to 
accommodate the width of the semi.  The back left corner of the semi extended out into the right-
hand travel lane of the interstate.  A police officer arrived and with emergency lights flashing, 
parked his cruiser on the shoulder at the top of the hill behind the semi.  The officer requested 
assistance with traffic control.  An employee of a company contracted by the local police to 
provide roadside assistance arrived in a panel truck.  Upon arrival, he was instructed by the 
police officer to park his vehicle with yellow emergency lights flashing at the bottom of the hill, 
approximately 100 yards behind the police cruiser.  After parking his vehicle on the shoulder as 
instructed, the contractor then exited the vehicle from the driver’s side and proceeded to walk up 
the hill toward the police cruiser.  A single-unit truck approached from behind in the right hand 
travel lane and tried to switch lanes when he observed the yellow emergency lights on the panel 
truck. When the driver of the single-unit truck switched to the middle lane, the driver struck the 
right-rear end of a semi trailer in the middle lane, lost control, swerved back into the right lane, 
sideswiped the ERT’s panel truck, then struck the ERT.  Upon being struck, the ERT was thrown 
over the side of the bridge 75 – 80 feet to the ground below.   The police officer called 
emergency medical services to the scene.  They arrived and detected no vital signs in the ERT.  
The coroner was called and upon arrival, declared the ERT dead at the scene of “multiple blunt 
force injuries secondary to motor vehicle versus pedestrian”. 
 
To prevent future occurrences of similar incidents, the following recommendations have 
been made: 
 
Recommendation No. 1:  A traffic control plan should be implemented and enforced 
immediately when the travel lane is obstructed.  
Recommendation No. 2: Ensure that the placement of various types of warning devices 
(portable signs, orange traffic cones, flares and/or portable changeable message signs) 
informs drivers of what to expect when approaching an incident scene. 
 
Recommendation No. 3: In addition to flashing lights, a permanent message board should 
be placed on the back of emergency response vehicles that routinely need to control traffic. 
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Recommendation No. 4: Ensure that personnel receive training in the proper procedures 
and the hazards associated with emergency operations for highway incidents.  
 
Recommendation No. 5:  When providing emergency roadside assistance, company policy 
for exiting emergency vehicles away from the traffic lanes should be enforced.   
 
Recommendation No. 6:  Braking mechanism performance checks should be routinely 
performed on all motor vehicles before entering roadways.   
 
Background 
 
The decedent had been employed approximately six months by a company that provided 
roadside assistance to motorists and the local police department.  The company employed 260 
persons, 30 were emergency road service technicians who operated panel trucks and tow trucks 
(flat beds and hooks) to assist disabled motorists and the local police.   
 
Prospective employees were required to undergo a background check, drug, and alcohol tests. 
Random drug and alcohol tests were performed on all employees after being hired. Emergency 
responder trainees had a 90 day trial period during which they rode with an experienced 
responder and were observed.  Responsibilities included, but were not limited to, assisting 
motorists with disabled vehicles, and assisting police in placing triangles, flares or other warning 
devices to slow traffic during emergency situations. The company contract with the police 
department stated that when providing support for a roadside emergency, the ERT was to always 
park his/her vehicle behind the police officer’s.  One safety technique responders were taught 
was to exit their vehicles on the passenger side when responding to an incident on a busy 
roadway and to use common sense.  Responders were equipped with ANSI-certified high 
visibility reflective vests and company uniforms.   
 
Investigation 
 
The Kentucky Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Program was notified via a 
newspaper report of an occupational fatality involving an ERT walking on the shoulder of a 
bridge on a busy interstate highway.  The employer and the police at the scene of the incident 
were interviewed.  The coroner record was also reviewed for this report.   
 
At approximately 9:00 AM on a winter day in 2005, a semi blew a tire while driving westward 
on a six lane interstate highway.  The speed limit was 55 miles per hour, the pavement was dry 
and the sky overcast.  Realizing he had blown the tire, the driver immediately steered the semi 
onto the right shoulder and at 9:05 AM called police for assistance.  The shoulder was on a 
bridge on the blind side of a hill, and was too narrow to accommodate the width of the semi.  
This caused the back left corner of the semi to extend into the right-hand travel lane of the 
interstate. A police officer arrived at the scene at 9:07 AM with emergency lights flashing, 
parked his cruiser on the bridge shoulder at the top of the hill approximately 50 yards behind the 
semi.   The officer assessed the situation and called the company contracted to support police 
during roadway emergencies for assistance with traffic control. An ERT was radioed to report to 
the scene, however, he was engaged in assisting another disabled motorist in a separate incident.  
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Another ERT heard the request, radioed that he was in the vicinity, and that he would dispatch to 
the scene.  At approximately 9:15 AM he arrived at the scene in a company van with yellow 
caution lights flashing on top of the panel truck.  He parked, per company policy, at the bottom 
of the hill approximately 75 – 100 yards behind the police cruiser.  The ERT, who had 100% 
hearing loss in his right ear, then exited the van from the driver’s side and walked toward the 
police cruiser to consult with the police officer on how to best manage traffic at the scene. He 
was wearing a reflective vest and company uniform. A single-unit truck approached from behind 
in the right hand travel lane traveling at approximately 55mph and tried to switch lanes when he 
observed the yellow emergency lights on the panel truck. When the driver of the single-unit truck 
switched to the middle lane, the driver struck the right-rear end of a semi trailer in the middle 
lane, and lost control. The driver swerved back into the right lane and tried to brake, sideswiped 
the ERT’s panel truck, then struck the ERT. After being struck, the ERT was thrown over the 
side of the bridge 75 – 80 feet to the ground below. The police officer at the scene immediately 
radioed dispatch services to summon emergency medical services to the scene.  Emergency 
medical services personnel arrived within minutes, found the ERT under the bridge and observed 
no vital signs.  The police officer contacted the local coroner who arrived and declared the ERT 
dead at the scene due to “multiple blunt force injuries secondary to motor vehicle versus 
pedestrian”. 
 
The police report stated that the brakes were found to be defective in the single-unit truck. 
 
Recommendations and Discussions: 
 
Recommendation No. 1:  A traffic control plan should be implemented and enforced 
immediately when the travel lane is obstructed.  
 
Discussion: Guidelines set forth by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway 
Administration, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), Chapter 6D:  Pedestrian 
and Worker Safety; Section 6D.03 Worker Safety Considerations, should be followed by 
incident responders.  In this situation, as stated in the MUTCD Section 6D.03(D),  a safety zone 
for responders should have been created using temporary traffic control techniques such as speed 
reduction and diverting traffic from the right-hand lane. The MUTCD Chapter 6C.04, Advance 
Warning Area,  describes a method of reducing the speed of traffic on highways by effective 
placement of the first warning sign in meters (feet) should be substantially longer—from 1.5 to 
2.25 times the speed limit in km/h (8 to 12 times the speed limit in mph). Since two or more 
advance warning signs are normally used for these conditions, the advance warning area should 
extend 450 m (1,500 ft) or more for open highway conditions (see Table 6C-1).  Section 6C.08 
Tapers, states that tapers are created by using a series of channelizing devices and/or pavement 
markings to move traffic out of or into the normal path.  
 
49 CFR 392, Subpart C – Stopped Vehicles, 392.22(b)(2(iv) states that “if a commercial motor 
vehicle is stopped within 500 feet of a curve, crest of a hill, or other obstruction to view, the 
driver shall place the warning signal required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section in the direction 
of the obstruction to view a distance of 100 feet to 500 feet from the stopped commercial motor 
vehicle so as to afford ample warning to other users of the highway” and to place warning 
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signals toward traffic and give motorists time to decelerate and adjust to the changing driving 
conditions.  
 
Ample time and distance should be provided for motorists to adjust to reduced travel speed and 
lane funneling.  This would have created a safer space for the ERT, police, and towing company 
to maneuver while responding to the situation. Additionally, radio and/or mobile phone 
communication between the ERT and police should be established prior to arrival on the scene 
that includes a hazard assessment of the incident and a clear description of duties to be 
performed by the ERT.  
 
Recommendation No. 2: Ensure that the placement of various types of warning devices 
(portable signs, orange traffic cones, flares and/or portable changeable message signs) 
informs drivers of what to expect when approaching an incident scene. 
 
Discussion: Part 6 of the November 2003 edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices (MUTCD) includes Chapter 6I-Control of traffic through traffic incident management 
areas. Chapter 6I defines a traffic incident management area as “an area of highway where 
temporary traffic controls are imposed by authorized officials in response to a road user incident, 
natural disaster, or special event. It extends from the first warning sign or emergency warning 
lights on a vehicle to the last temporary traffic control device or to a point where vehicles return 
to the original lane alignment and are clear of the traffic incident.” 
Warning devices are a means by which response personnel can convey information to motorists 
approaching an incident scene, referred to as the “advance warning area. ” The advance warning 
area may vary from a single sign or high-intensity rotating, flashing, oscillating, or strobe lights 
on a vehicle to a series of signs in advance of the incident scene.  
Weather conditions, curves and hills that limit visibility of the incident scene require that the 
advance warning devices be placed at an even greater distance. An incident occurring in an 
intersection requires advance warning signs, devices, and markings to be used on all cross 
streets, as appropriate. 
 
Portable signs can be transported on a response vehicle to the incident scene where they can be 
placed in a location that allows maximum visibility to oncoming traffic. The manual on uniform 
traffic control devices (MUTCD) states “where special emphasis is needed, signs may be placed 
on both the left and right sides of the roadway. Signs mounted on portable supports may be 
placed within the roadway itself. Signs may also be mounted on or above barricades.” 
Flares and orange traffic cones may be used individually or together to provide advance warning. 
To enhance the visibility of the orange traffic cones, flares may be placed next to them, where 
the glow from the burning flare would reflect off of and illuminate the cone. 
At this incident, no flares and or traffic cones were used or other traffic control devices such as 
signs were used. 
 
Recommendation No. 3: In addition to flashing lights, a permanent message board should 
be placed on the back of emergency response vehicles that routinely need to control traffic. 
 
Discussion: Permanent message boards on the back of emergency response vehicles provide a 
safe and effective way to alert and warn motorists of traffic incidents and changes. Portable 
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changeable message signs can be used as temporary traffic control devices. The flexibility to 
display various messages allows the signs to be used in a wide variety of applications (e.g., at a 
crash or for emergency incident management). The primary purpose of portable changeable 
message signs is to advise the road user of unexpected situations. Some typical applications may 
include: where the speed of vehicular traffic is expected to drop substantially; where crash or 
incident management is needed; or where changes in road user pattern occur. 
 
Recommendation No. 4: Ensure that personnel receive training in the proper procedures 
and the hazards associated with emergency operations for highway incidents.  
 
Discussion: Workers who respond to highway incidents have numerous responsibilities, ranging 
from traffic control to assisting injured or stranded motorists. Responders must be trained to 
safely conduct multiple tasks near moving traffic. Because of the variability of each incident, all 
emergency responders should have ongoing, appropriate, task-specific training. 
 
Recommendation No. 5:  When providing emergency roadside assistance, company policy 
for exiting emergency vehicles away from the traffic lanes should be enforced. 
 
Discussion: According to a company representative, ERTs, when working on busy roadways, 
were trained to exit vehicles away from traffic and to walk as far away from traffic as possible.  
In this instance, the ERT had exited from the vehicle on the driver’s side and was walking to the 
police cruiser for consultation regarding the situation.  The driver should then have approached 
the hazardous scene by walking along the outside of the shoulder. This would have created a 
longer safe zone for responders to work in. 
 
Recommendation No. 6:  Braking mechanism performance checks should be routinely 
performed on all motor vehicles before entering roadways. 
 
Discussion: The single-unit truck involved in this incident was determined to have defective 
brakes. A braking mechanism performance check and maintenance of the vehicle should have 
been performed on the vehicle before entering the roadway to ensure that if emergency braking 
was needed, the action could be carried out (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration- 
Subpart C —§393.40 Required brake systems, §396.3 Inspection, repair and maintenance).  
 
Cause of Death 
 
The death certificate states the cause of death was due to, “multiple blunt force injuries 
secondary to motor vehicle versus pedestrian”. 
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